Die Poesie ist für Hegel die Endform der Kunst, in der die Kunst im Allgemeinen durch die Religion überwunden wird. Die These, dass die Poesie den anderen Künsten, d.h. der Architektur, der Skulptur, der Malerei und der Musik, überlegen ist, spricht von einer besonderen Hierarchisierung und Periodisierung, die Hegel zwischen die verschiedenen Kunstformen einführt. Das Kriterium für diese Hierarchisierung und Periodisierung ist offensichtlich das gleiche, nach dem Hegel die Kunst wiederum als eine der Religion und der Philosophie unterlegene Form betrachtet. (...) Dass die Poesie eine den anderen Künsten überlegene Kunstform ist, ist auf den ersten Blick eine überraschende These; und sie wirkt noch überraschender, wenn man sie durch die These ergänzt, dass die Kunst wiederum durch die Religion und die Philosophie als weitere Phasen eines linearen Prozesses aufgehoben wird. Um was für einen linearen Prozess handelt es sich hier eigentlich? Ein linearer Prozess wohin? Der Prozess, von dem Hegel in diesem Kontext spricht, ist ein Erkenntnisprozess, und zwar ein ziemlich spezifischer Erkenntnisprozess, nämlich Erkenntnis des Absoluten. Die Poesiegattung, die für Hegel die Endphase der Kunst ausmacht, ist das moderne Drama, in dessen Zentrum die Darstellung des Charakters und der Handlungen seiner verschiedenen Gestalten steht. Was hat das alles aber mit dem Absoluten zu tun? Was haben das Drama und seine Subgattungen - der Tragödie, der Komödie, der Satire usw. - mit Religion und Philosophie zu tun? Hegel verbindet außerdem die Kunst mit dem Absoluten als eine Erkenntnisform desselben. Aber in welchem Sinne ist die Kunst Erkenntnis? Ist Kunst nicht eher Darstellung und Ausdruck subjektiver Gefühle und Ideen - und eben nicht ein Erfassen der Realität, eben nicht eine Erkenntnisform der Wirklichkeit? Um den allgemeinen Sinn von Hegels Ästhetik und dadurch die besondere Rolle, die er darin der Poesie zuschreibt, verstehen zu können, ist es unentbehrlich, die oben gestellten Fragen zu beantworten. Ein theoretisches und exegetisches Modell zu liefern, das imstande ist, eine solche Aufgabe zu erfüllen, ist das Ziel dieses Beitrags. (shrink)

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. (...) A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. (shrink)

La exterioridad de una cosa o de un estado de cosas configurados por el ser humano no implica para Hegel que esa cosa o ese estado de cosas deban ya por ello ser considerados como formas del espíritu objetivo, mientras que en contrapartida las formas del espíritu absoluto estarían entonces conformadas por contenidos ideales del pensamiento. La diferencia entre espíritu objetivo y espíritu absoluto no radica en la diferencia entre lo que el espíritu humano “hace” y lo que “conoce”. En (...) efecto, las obras de arte, es decir, configuraciones exteriores hechas por el ser humano utilizando, por ejemplo, piedras, metales, colores o sonidos, son para Hegel instancias del espíritu absoluto, mientras que, por su parte, realidades que en cuanto tales no son intuibles, como, por ejemplo, los contratos o la organización estatal, son instancias del espíritu objetivo. Que Hegel considere al arte como una forma del espíritu absoluto pone de manifiesto que, a sus ojos, las cosas que intuimos en el universo son, en rigor, productos del propio sujeto que las conoce. Espontáneamente el sujeto cognoscente piensa que lo que intuye es algo que recibe desde un mundo externo; sostener que el arte es una forma de conocimiento es justamente el modo como Hegel está expresando que lo intuido es en todos los casos un contenido producido por el propio espíritu, que es, por así decirlo, una obra de arte humano. En el arte mismo, sin embargo, la producción de la cosa intuible es insuficiente, dado que el material que el espíritu utiliza para sus configuraciones conserva en mayor o menor medida, según el caso, una determinidad propia que resiste a la determinidad que el espíritu busca conferirle. Por esta razón, las obras de arte se presentan inicialmente como productos arbitrarios. Recién cuando integra sus intuiciones en la actividad de comprensión -actividad cognitiva con la que opera la filosofía- y media con ello completamente la determinidad de los contenidos intuidos, el espíritu configura finalmente un universo que le es propio y específico. El objetivo de mi ponencia es reconstruir desde el marco teórico recién expuesto el sentido y función que Hegel le atribuye al arte en su teoría del conocimiento. (shrink)

Ao analisar a teoria da memória mecânica de Hegel, a maioria dos intérpretes considerou apenas dois aspectos da memorização mecânica: o desaparecimento do significado nas palavras mecânicamente memorizadas ou a internalização totalmente abstrata da mente que as memoriza. No primeiro caso, a interpretação concentrou-se na relação entre o significante e o significado das palavras; no segundo caso, concentrou-se na relação entre o signo linguístico como um todo e a mente. Entretanto, a posição específica da memória mecânica na sistematização das atividades (...) cognitivas de Hegel não se baseia nessas duas relações, mas na relação entre o significado de cada palavra e o significado das outras palavras. Ao memorizar de cor fileiras de palavras que não estão conectadas umas às outras por seus significados, mas apenas pela força da mente que decide memorizá-las juntas, a mente se liberta de qualquer conteúdo dado externamente e sublima a referência linear do conteúdo representacional de cada significado à intuição em sua origem. A atualização do poder da mente de interconectar conteúdos de acordo com as próprias regras lógicas da mente realiza, para Hegel, a transição para o pensamento propriamente dito. (shrink)

From antiquity, Galenic physicians extensively discussed the active powers of simple and compound drugs. In their views, simple drugs, that is, single ingredients, acted according to their material qualities and the properties of their substance. As for compound drugs, their efficacy resulted from the mutual interaction of their ingredients and their modes of preparation. In the late Renaissance, Galenic physicians and naturalists, such as Leonhart Fuchs and Pietro Andrea Mattioli, attempted to explain these pharmacological properties or “faculties” at the intersection (...) of medicine, botany, and natural philosophy. This chapter examines the case of the Italian physician and botanist Andrea Cesalpino. His pharmacological treatise De medicamentorum facultatibus [On the Faculties of Drugs, 1593] was particularly significant for its reception of ancient and medieval texts on drug properties, materia medica, and the role of the senses in the knowledge of bodies. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant development of metacontrol processes that can be (...) used to shape and balance it. (shrink)

In recent literature, it has been suggested that Lange’s social and political philosophy is separate from his neo-Kantian program. Prima facie, this interpretation makes sense given that Lange argues for an account of social norms that builds on Darwin and Smith rather than on Kant. Still, this paper argues that elements of psychophysiological transcendentalism can be found in Lange’s social and political philosophy. A detailed examination of the second edition of the History of Materialism, Schiller’s Poems, and the second edition (...) of The Worker’s Question reveals that Lange sought to develop a systematic foundation of psychophysiological transcendentalism that is presupposed in his social and political philosophy. This allows for a more detailed understanding of Lange’s practical philosophy and assures him a position in the tradition of neo-Kantian socialism. (shrink)

Mobsters and others engaged in risky forms of social coordination and coercion often communicate by saying something that is overtly innocuous but transmits another message ‘off record’. In both ordinary conversation and political discourse, insinuation and other forms of indirection, like joking, offer significant protection from liability. However, they do not confer blanket immunity: speakers can be held to account for an ‘off record’ message, if the only reasonable interpreta- tions of their utterance involve a commitment to it. Legal liability (...) for speech in the service of criminal behavior displays a similar profile of significant protection from indirection along with potential liability for reasonable interpretations. Specifically, in both ordinary and legal contexts, liability depends on how a reasonable speaker would expect a reasonable hearer to interpret their utterance in the context of utter- ance, rather than on the actual speaker’s claimed communicative intentions. (shrink)

Liberados el romanticismo y el idealismo del lastre secular de su vínculo imaginario con la “catástrofe alemana” deviene una vez más posible recurrir a ellos para repensar los problemas teóricos y prácticos del presente y localizar nuevos instrumentos conceptuales para su solución. En este contexto recobran interés numerosos temas que fueron objetos privilegiados de reflexión por parte de los pensadores románticos e idealistas. El romanticismo exaltó la Revolución Francesa como un acontecimiento epocal de reivindicación de los derechos de los individuos (...) contra la opresión de las formas anquilosadas de la religión y la organización estatal. Los pensadores románticos se rebelaron contra el orden burgués en todas sus formas, contra la pauta ubicua de la razón económico-instrumental. Para Kant, lo que es útil e intercambiable no posee dignidad, sino precio. El rechazo romántico de la exhaustiva reducción del mundo a mercancía conduce a la recuperación del valor infinito de la naturaleza, en esa medida, a su “reencantamiento”. En una misma línea, el romanticismo preconiza tendencialmente todos los fenómenos no cuantificables, aquéllos que no permiten ser calculados en términos mercantiles: la corporeidad, el erotismo, la pasión, la imaginación y la fantasía, el arte y la poesía, lo telúrico, la diversidad individual y cultural. El idealismo, por su parte, busca una síntesis entre la concepción ilustrada del mundo material y la visión pre-moderna del mismo. El resultado de esa mediación es la explicitación de las estructuras del propio espíritu humano presentes en su comprensión del mundo, toda vez que para el idealismo el mundo es siempre la teoría de la mente humana sobre el mundo. El pensamiento ilustrado pudo por ello confundir la filosofía de la naturaleza de los idealistas con una visión de lo material viciada de antropomorfismo, más próxima a la mística y a los bestiarios medievales que a las ciencias naturales de la Edad Moderna. El idealismo, por el contrario, encuentra en esta suerte de principio antrópico de toda teoría un factor de liberación moral y política. La toma de conciencia de que es el sujeto el que crea sistemas de sentido y que, por tanto, éstos deben reflejar en sí mismos su origen humano, implica el corolario de que con las teorías –sea cual sea el ámbito de la realidad que ellas busquen explicar– se trata en verdad de dispositivos de ordenamiento para el conocimiento y la acción construidas por la propia subjetividad humana; en esta medida, en su origen no se encuentran datos brutos de un supuesto orden natural que debe, por tanto, ser respetado sacralmente, sino la propia comunidad de sujetos vivientes. Aunque haya dejado tras de sí y olvidado el proceso de mediaciones que le dio origen, aunque se presente, pues, como replegado sobre sí mismo y, en esa medida, como la suma de re-presentaciones de un orden encontrado en el mundo, cada sistema de ideas contiene el conjunto de prácticas subjetivas inferenciales que lo constituyeron y que fueron realizadas por múltiples sujetos en plexos históricos concretos. El idealismo consiste en explicitar a la subjetividad actuando en el objeto y, con ello, en conminar el peligro de la mutación de las teorías en ideologías. El fundamento último de la libertad descansa para el idealismo menos en el orden determinado que funciona como condición de posibilidad del ejercicio de la libertad que en el modo de autoconcepción de la propia subjetividad. A partir del mundo de las autoconcepciones del sujeto –para Hegel se trata del ámbito específico del sujeto que ha devenido por ello mismo absoluto– derivan luego, como sus corolarios prácticos, las formas concretas de ordenamiento social y político. Si bien asume en sí numerosos motivos románticos, el idealismo aspira también a una mediación de esos elementos con las contribuciones teóricas de la Ilustración, con la que guarda entonces una relación menos crítica que el romanticismo. Fruto de este espíritu más ecuménico y menos orientado a la ruptura, defiende una concepción más pacífica de la racionalidad capitalista y el mundo burgués. Hegel reivindica así el rol positivo del mercado con su división social del trabajo y una concepción menos revolucionaria y más reformista de la vida política. El neoliberalismo contemporáneo se concibe a sí mismo como el sistema que resulta naturalmente del principio de la libertad negativa. Una tesis central del idealismo alemán es que para que sea posible el ejercicio de la capacidad de decidirse autónomamente por diferentes metas es necesario el marco efectivo de la libertad positiva. Sin la presencia de un orden racional con poder coercitivo sobre los miembros de la sociedad para regular su conducta, la libertad negativa de esos miembros, a primera vista disminuida y parcialmente cercenada por aquel orden, no es en la práctica posible. (shrink)

I propose a distinct type of robustness, which I suggest can support a confirmatory role in scientific reasoning, contrary to the usual philosophical claims. In model robustness, repeated production of the empirically successful model prediction or retrodiction against a background of independentlysupported and varying model constructions, within a group of models containing a shared causal factor, may suggest how confident we can be in the causal factor and predictions/retrodictions, especially once supported by a variety of evidence framework. I present climate (...) models of greenhouse gas global warming of the 20th Century as an example, and emphasize climate scientists’ discussions of robust models and causal aspects. The account is intended as applicable to a broad array of sciences that use complex modeling techniques. (shrink)

This article discusses various dangers that accompany the supposedly benign methods in behavioral evoltutionary biology and evolutionary psychology that fall under the framework of "methodological adaptationism." A "Logic of Research Questions" is proposed that aids in clarifying the reasoning problems that arise due to the framework under critique. The live, and widely practiced, " evolutionary factors" framework is offered as the key comparison and alternative. The article goes beyond the traditional critique of Stephen Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, to (...) present problems such as the disappearance of evidence, the mishandling of the null hypothesis, and failures in scientific reasoning, exemplified by a case from human behavioral ecology. In conclusion the paper shows that "methodological adaptationism" does not deserve its benign reputation. (shrink)

A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor (...) representations in explaining intentional action. Next, we characterize the respective functions of intentions and motor representations, the differences in representational format and content that these imply, and the interface challenge these differences in turn raise. We then evaluate Butterfill and Sinigaglia’s recent answer to this interface challenge, according to which intentions refer to action outcomes by way of demonstrative deference to motor representations. We present some worries for this proposal, arguing that, among other things, it implicitly presupposes a solution to the problem, and so cannot help to resolve it. Finally, we suggest that we may make some progress on this puzzle by positing a “content-preserving causal process” taking place between intentions and motor representations, and we offer a proposal for how this might work. (shrink)

Recent philosophical attention to climate models has highlighted their weaknesses and uncertainties. Here I address the ways that models gain support through observational data. I review examples of model fit, variety of evidence, and independent support for aspects of the models, contrasting my analysis with that of other philosophers. I also investigate model robustness, which often emerges when comparing climate models simulating the same time period or set of conditions. Starting from Michael Weisberg’s analysis of robustness, I conclude that his (...) approach involves a version of reasoning from variety of evidence, enabling this robustness to be a confirmatory virtue.. (shrink)

Se expone, en este trabajo, una teoría que muestra cómo es que el hombre extrae desde su propio fondo ciertas ideas innatas que proyecta en los entes que percibe y que piensa, particularmente las ideas de ser y de unidad. Además, se muestra que el grado de proyección de estas ideas (las ideas de ser y de unidad) sobre los entes que el entendimiento percibe, está en función del grado de alegría o de angustia que un hombre siente. Para el (...) análisis de las ideas innatas y de las emociones, me baso sobre todo en la filosofía racionalista (Descartes, Spinoza y Leibniz). Aunque, para el análisis de las emociones, también me apoyo en la filosofía heideggeriana. Por último, reflexionando a partir del horizonte del pensamiento analógico, trazado por Beuchot, se expone cómo esta teoría innatista de la proyección puede servir para responder al relativismo absoluto de la posmodernidad. (shrink)

I discuss two types of evidential problems with the most widely touted experiments in evolutionary psychology, those performed by Leda Cosmides and interpreted by Cosmides and John Tooby. First, and despite Cosmides and Tooby's claims to the contrary, these experiments don't fulfil the standards of evidence of evolutionary biology. Second Cosmides and Tooby claim to have performed a crucial experiment, and to have eliminated rival approaches. Though they claim that their results are consistent with their theory but contradictory to the (...) leading non-evolutionary alternative, Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas theory, I argue that this claim is unsupported. In addition, some of Cosmides and Tooby's interpretations arise from misguided and simplistic understandings of evolutionary biology. While I endorse the incorporation of evolutionary approaches into psychology, I reject the claims of Cosmides and Tooby that a modular approach is the only one supported by evolutionary biology. Lewontin's critical examinations of the applications of adaptationist thinking provide a background of evidentiary standards against which to view the currently fashionable claims of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

The emphasis on the limitations of objectivity, in specific guises and networks, has been a continuing theme of contemporary analytic philosophy for the past few decades. The popular sport of baiting feminist philosophers — into pointing to what's left out of objective knowledge, or into describing what methods, exactly, they would offer to replace the powerful objective methods grounding scientific knowledge — embodies a blatant double standard which has the effect of constantly putting feminist epistemologists on the defensive, on the (...) fringes, on the run.This strategy can only work if objectivity is transparent, simple, stable, and clear in its meaning. It most certainly is not. In fact, taking objectivity as a sort of beautiful primitive, self-evident in its value, and all-powerful in its revelatory power, requires careless philosophy, and the best workers in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science have made reworked definitions of objectivity absolutely central to their own projects. In fact, classic feminist concerns with exploring the impact of sex and gender on knowledge, understanding, and other relations between human beings and the rest of the world fall squarely within the sort of human and social settings thatare already considered central in most current analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. I argue that the burden of proof is clearly on those who wish toreject the centrality and relevance of sex and gender to our most fundamental philosophical work on knowledge and reality. (shrink)

Social contract thought has always contained multiple and mutually conflicting lines of argument; the minimalist contractarianism so influential today represents the weaker of two main constellations of claims. I make the case for a Kantian contract theory that emphasizes the bedrock principle of consent of the governed instead of the mere heuristic device of the exit from the state of nature. Such a shift in emphasis resolves two classic difficulties: tradi- tional contract theory’s ahistorical presumption of a pre-political settlement, and (...) its impossibly high demands on citizens seeking to practice self-rule. Kant’s solutions to these problems of property rights and citizenship are found in his political works, rather than the ethical works through which Kant’s political theory is usually interpreted. (shrink)

Para Hegel, Asia señala el comienzo de la historia universal, mientras que Europa señala su consumación y final. La América precolombina, al igual que la África negra, están para Hegel fuera de la historia universal; en cuanto a la historia de América tras su descubrimiento por los europeos, Hegel sostiene que lo que ha sucedido desde entonces en el continente americano proviene, en rigor, del “principio de Europa”. Hegel contrapone a su vez la historia de América Latina a la de (...) los actuales Estados Unidos en términos del respectivo desarrollo económico y social. Hegel atribuye la brecha de desarrollo entre las dos Américas, por un lado, a que América Latina es católica y Estados Unidos es mayoritariamente protestante, y, por el otro, a que América Latina fue “conquistada”, mientras que Estados Unidos fue “colonizado”. Sobre la base del análisis de los textos pertinentes de la obra de Hegel, se reconstruirá su teoría sobre el desigual nivel de desarrollo socio-económico de América Latina y Estados Unidos y se evaluará la plausibilidad, actualidad y eventual deficiencia de la misma. (shrink)

Las relaciones que entre mística y filosofía contemporánea establecieron algunos filósofos de la Escuela de Madrid, fueron expuestas a colación del cuarto centenario de San Juan de la Cruz celebrado en México (1942), las cuales -y según la visión de José Gaos en su breve pero denso Filosofía y mística aquí y ahora- tuvieron fuertes concomitancias entre sí, y su estela permanece en forma de “vasos comunicantes” con autores contemporáneos como Fernando Rielo (1923-2004), quien también nos ofreció su visión (1992) (...) sobre la mística y la Escuela. (shrink)

Los textos compilados en este libro hablan fundamentalmente de "Leibniz en diálogo", es decir, de Leibniz en su lectura de la tradición, en su confrontación con la filosofía y la ciencia de sus coetáneos; pero también hablan de la recepción y transformación de sus ideas por parte de las corrientes de pensamiento que le siguieron y de este modo se nutrieron de su espíritu intelectual. No pretende esta ser una edición exhaustiva, pero no por ello deja de significar la presente (...) una amplia selección de estudios de ámbito internacional sobre el significado filosófico de Leibniz como pensador abierto, plural y conciliador. Son aquí objeto de estudio las diferentes vías de comunicación entabladas por Leibniz con la tradición, con su época o con la filosofía posterior. Este volumen pretende ser una contribución a la difusión del pensamiento leibniziano entre los profesores y estudiantes de filosofía, a la promoción del debate entre los especialistas y a la mayor consolidación de la comunidad internacional de investigadores sobre Leibniz. (shrink)

Abstract: According to Hegel, comprehension proper is the ostensible self-determination of thinking with the determinations that spontaneously present themselves as independent objects. By positing objective determinations as the own determinations of thought, comprehension reveals thinking as an activity that is practical. For Hegel, comprehending allegedly extrinsic objects, and free willing of the own determinations of the thinking and willing subject, are in essence the same activity: only subjects who can choose between the determinations that determine them can comprehend objects. To (...) elucidate: only subjects who are able to actively determine themselves with the determinations that spontaneously determine them are able to analyse and comprehend the objects of their knowing activity. Thought that can think itself defines, according to Hegel, the true nature of the human spirit. (shrink)

Today's climate models are supported in a couple of ways that receive little attention from philosophers or climate scientists. In addition to standard 'model fit', wherein a model's simulation is compared to observational data, there is an additional type of confirmation available through the variety of instances of model fit. When a model performs well at fitting first one variable and then another, the probability of the model under some standard confirmation function, say, likelihood, goes up more than under each (...) individual case of fit alone. Thus, two instances of fit of distinct variables of a global climate model using distinct data sets considered collectively will provide stronger evidence for a model than either one of the instances considered individually. This has consequences for model robustness. Sets of models that produce robust results will, if their assumptions vary enough and they each are observationally sound, provide reasons to endorse common structures found in those models. Finally, independent empirical support for aspects and assumptions of the model provides an additional confirmational virtue for climate models, contrary to what is implied by some current philosophical writing on this topic. (shrink)

When natural selection theory was presented, much active philosophical debate, in which Darwin himself participated, centered on its hypothetical nature, its explanatory power, and Darwin's methodology. Upon first examination, Darwin's support of his theory seems to consist of a set of claims pertaining to various aspects of explanatory success. I analyze the support of his method and theory given in the Origin of Species and private correspondence, and conclude that an interpretation focusing on the explanatory strengths of natural selection theory (...) accurately reflects neither Darwin's own self-consciously held views, nor the nature of his support. Darwin's methodological and philosophical arguments were at once consistently empiricist and more sophisticated than such interpretations credit to him. (shrink)

A precise formulation of the structure of modern evolutionary theory has proved elusive. In this paper, I introduce and develop a formal approach to the structure of population genetics, evolutionary theory's most developed sub-theory. Under the semantic approach, used as a framework in this paper, presenting a theory consists in presenting a related family of models. I offer general guidelines and examples for the classification of population genetics models; the defining features of the models are taken to be their state (...) spaces, parameters, and laws. The suggestions regarding the various aspects of the characterization of population genetics models provide an outline for further detailed research. (shrink)

In men and women sexual arousal culminates in orgasm, with female orgasm solely from sexual intercourse often regarded as a unique feature of human sexuality. However, orgasm from sexual intercourse occurs more reliably in men than in women, likely reflecting the different types of physical stimulation men and women require for orgasm. In men, orgasms are under strong selective pressure as orgasms are coupled with ejaculation and thus contribute to male reproductive success. By contrast, women's orgasms in intercourse are highly (...) variable and are under little selective pressure as they are not a reproductive necessity. The proximal mechanisms producing variability in women's orgasms are little understood. In 1924 Marie Bonaparte proposed that a shorter distance between a woman's clitoris and her urethral meatus (CUMD) increased her likelihood of experiencing orgasm in intercourse. She based this on her published data that were never statistically analyzed. In 1940 Landis and colleagues published similar data suggesting the same relationship, but these data too were never fully analyzed. We analyzed raw data from these two studies and found that both demonstrate a strong inverse relationship between CUMD and orgasm during intercourse. Unresolved is whether this increased likelihood of orgasm with shorter CUMD reflects increased penile–clitoral contact during sexual intercourse or increased penile stimulation of internal aspects of the clitoris. CUMD likely reflects prenatal androgen exposure, with higher androgen levels producing larger distances. Thus these results suggest that women exposed to lower levels of prenatal androgens are more likely to experience orgasm during sexual intercourse. . (shrink)

I suggest following Paul Feyerabend's own advice, and interpreting Feyerabend's work in light of the principles laid out by John Stuart Mill. A review of Mill's essay, On Liberty, emphasizes the importance Mill placed on open and critical discussion for the vitality and progress of various aspects of human life, including the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Many of Feyerabend's more unusual stances, I suggest, are best interpreted as attempts to play certain roles--especially the role of "defender of unpopular minority opinion"--that (...) are necessary to fulfilling Mill's conditions for rational exchange and optimal human development. (shrink)

Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness (...) remains very much open. In this paper, I contrast two disorders affecting the control of voluntary action: the anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior. Although in both conditions patients fail to inhibit actions that are elicited by objects in the environment but inappropriate with respect to the wider context, these actions are experienced in radically different ways by the two groups of patients. I discuss how top-down and bottom-up processes involved in the generation of agentive self-awareness would have to be related in order to account for these differences. (shrink)

The aim of this master’s thesis is to analyse and highlight the interaction between science, politics and law. More precisely, our research question concerns the use of scientific arguments in social spheres (notably in politics and law) instead of legal or political arguments. In fact, we want to raise the way in which certain actors invoke scientific arguments to impose "objective" elements of fact in debate and, in this way, refrain from politically and "subjectively" discussing these same elements (or, at (...) least, their social consequences). This Master’s thesis will adopt an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (chapter 1) mobilising philosophy of science, philosophy of law, sociology of law, legal technique and analytical theories. Then, we will apply it to a case study: the European regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) after the European Court of Justice (CJEU) ruling of 25 July 2015 (chapter 2). The first chapter will provide theoretical elements to rethink the interaction between science, politics and law. The first section will propose a 'state of the art’ of the philosophical literature on the relationship between science (as a regime of truth) and politics. This master’s thesis will assess a truth under construction rather than a transcendental truth. Section 2 anticipates authoritarian claims based on science by considering the relationship science can have with power (Foucault). A solid review of philosophical, sociological and legal literature highlights the risks of giving decision-making power to an all-powerful science. Notably, the use of science to justify discriminatory policies is emphasised as these policies could not be challenged because, at the time, it was considered an objective scientific truth. Finally, section 3 offers a critique of the narratives of neutral and objective science, through the approach of science in action. This sociological approach presented all the doubts and subjectivity of science in action. The second chapter will propose a case study to illustrate the theoretical framework. We have chosen GMOs because they constitute a hybrid 'event', marked by scientific controversies, and with major socio-economic implications. The legal framework of GMOs in the European Union will be presented in the first section. In addition, the legal status of new breeding techniques (NBTs) will be examined. The second section will analyse the ruling of the European Court of Justice which made NBTs subject to GMO regulation. Finally, the third section will propose a reflection on the philosophy of law on the modes of existence of scientific, legal and political disciplines. (shrink)

My contribution to this Symposium focuses on the links between sexuality and reproduction from the evolutionary point of view.' The relation between women's sexuality and reproduction is particularly importantb ecause of a vital intersectionb etweenp olitics and biology feminists have noticed, for more than a century, that women's identity is often defined in terms of her reproductive capacity. More recently, in the second wave of the feminist movement in the United States, debates about women'si dentityh ave explicitlyi ncludeds exuality;m uch (...) feminist argument in the late 1960's and early 1970's involved an attempt to separate out an autonomous female sexuality from women's reproductive functions. It is especially relevant, then, to examine biological arguments, particularlye volutionarya rgumentst, o see what they say about whether and how women's sexuality is related to reproduction. We shall find that many evolutionarya rgumentss eem to supportt he direct linkingo f female sexualitya nd reproductionY. et I will argue that this supporti s not well-groundedI. n fact, I think evolutionarye xplanationso f female sexuality exemplify how social beliefs and social agendas can influence very basic biological explanations of fundamental physiological processes. In this paper, I shall spend some time spelling out a few examples in which assumptions about the close link between reproduction and sexuality yield misleading results, then I shall conclude with a discussion of the consequences of this case study for issues in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The thesis that existence is radically different from the determinacy of an actually existing thing –Kant considers this thesis to be the unsurmountable objection against the cosmological and the ontological argument– is the same thesis that demands a specific explanation of the existence of that actually existing thing. The notion of existence that results from its complete exclusion from the realm of the contents thoroughgoing determined by real predicates requires, thus, precisely because this thoroughness excludes it, a specific reason that (...) explains that in the actually existing thing its own actual existence is in fact united with its own determinacy; that notion of existence, however, cancels at the same time the requirement of a sufficient reason of the existence of what actually exists, and again for the same reason, namely, because since existence is as such excluded from the determinacy of the existing things, it radically differs from the specific realm where determinacy is constituted (that is why existing things are thoroughgoing determined as possible), and, therefore, it invalidates any application to itself of the logical laws that are valid only for the merely possible domain of determinacy. (shrink)

La actividad teórica y la actividad práctica han sido tradicionalmente entendidas como complementarias en el sentido que mediante la actividad teórica el sujeto se apropiaría idealmente de los objetos del mundo externo, mientras que mediante la actividad práctica realizaría sus propias metas subjetivas en el mundo. Sin embargo, dicho modelo plantea un conjunto de graves problemas exegéticos y conceptuales sobre la estructura y significado de la entera filosofía del espíritu de Hegel. En este artículo buscaremos esclarecer qué es a ojos (...) de Hegel lo propiamente específico de la actividad teórica y de la actividad práctica, para, sobre esa base, ofrecer un modelo exegético que logre dar satisfactoriamente cuenta de la particular periodización general que Hegel propone sobre las diferentes formas de actividad del espíritu humano. (shrink)

La presente investigación tiene como propósito general asumir un posicionamiento filosófico en clave histórico-social y de tipo anti-relativista para analizar el desarrollo histórico de la matemática, el cual aplicaremos a un caso en particular: la matemática del antiguo Egipto. Para ello se discutirán y criticarán, en primera instancia, determinadas posiciones filosóficas afines al cuasi-empirismo en matemática que, siendo relativistas, permitirán delinear nuestro propio posicionamiento en contraste: la existencia de una «matemática situada». Esta categoría filosófica tendrá como sustento teórico la noción (...) de conocimiento situado. Además, las implicaciones de esta son, según sostenemos, tanto filosóficas como historiográficas, ya que servirá para analizar las características del corpus de problemas matemáticos egipcios registrados en los diversos papiros matemáticos. En particular, haremos referencia a las expresiones lingüísticas egipcias para denotar las diversas operaciones aritméticas y el carácter algorítmico de los problemas, así como también la cuestión epistemológica de la empiria y cómo la perspectiva situada permite superar la dicotomía entre una matemática pura y otra aplicada, que consideramos no es ubicua para abordar la interpretación de la práctica matemática del antiguo país del Nilo. Palabras clave: Filosofía de la matemática, Anti-relativismo, Matemática situada, Extrañeza del pasado, Matemática egipcia. (shrink)

Climate change assessments rely upon scenarios of socioeconomic developments to conceptualize alternative outcomes for global greenhouse gas emissions. These are used in conjunction with climate models to make projections of future climate. Specifically, the estimations of greenhouse gas emissions based on socioeconomic scenarios constrain climate models in their outcomes of temperatures, precipitation, etc. Traditionally, the fundamental logic of the socioeconomic scenarios—that is, the logic that makes them plausible—is developed and prioritized using methods that are very subjective. This introduces a fundamental (...) challenge for climate change assessment: The veracity of projections of future climate currently rests on subjective ground. We elaborate on these subjective aspects of scenarios in climate change research. We then consider an alternative method for developing scenarios, a systems dynamics approach called ‘Cross-Impact Balance’ (CIB) analysis. We discuss notions of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ as criteria for distinguishing appropriate scenario methods for climate change research. We distinguish seven distinct meanings of ‘objective,’ and demonstrate that CIB analysis is more objective than traditional subjective approaches. However, we also consider criticisms concerning which of the seven meanings of ‘objective’ are appropriate for scenario work. Finally, we arrive at conclusions regarding which meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ are relevant for climate change research. Because scientific assessments uncover knowledge relevant to the responses of a real, independently existing climate system, this requires scenario methodologies employed in such studies to also uphold the seven meanings of ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity.’. (shrink)

I argue that four of the fundamental claims of those calling themselves `genic pluralists'Philip Kitcher, Kim Sterelny, and Ken Watersare defective. First, they claim that once genic selectionism is recognized, the units of selection problems will be dissolved. Second, Sterelny and Kitcher claim that there are no targets of selection. Third, Sterelny, Kitcher, and Waters claim that they have a concept of genic causation that allows them to give independent genic causal accounts of all selection processes. I argue that each (...) one of these claims is either false or misleading. Moreover, the challenge that arises from the availability of genic causal accounts, namely, the inability to choose on rational grounds among genic and higher-level accounts, is unsupported. (shrink)

This paper argues that the ‘scientific dispute’ between Hermann Cohen and Rudolf Stammler is symptomatic of a philosophical movement of left-wing Kant interpretations at the turn of the twentieth century. By outlining influential predecessors that shaped Cohen’s and Stammler’s thinking, I show that their Kantian justifications of socialism differ regarding their conception of law, history, and the political implications that follow from their practical philosophies. Against scholars who suggest that the Marburg School’s view on socialism was a coherent school of (...) thought, I introduce the concept of ‘left-Kantianism’ as an open term that includes a wide variety of novel socialist approaches to Kant at the time. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish various ways in which empirical claims about evolutionary and ecological models can be supported by data. I describe three basic factors bearing on confirmation of empirical claims: fit of the model to data; independent testing of various aspects of the model, and variety of evident. A brief description of the kinds of confirmation is followed by examples of each kind, drawn from a range of evolutionary and ecological theories. I conclude that the greater complexity and (...) precision of my approach, as compared to, for instance, a Popperian approach, can facilitate detailed analysis and comparison of empirical claims. (shrink)

In the process of knowledge imagination is, according to Hegel, the point where the human mind dissociates the object into two different contents - i.e. the thing of the external world and the internal content of the mind -, so that both versions of the object must corroborate each other in the way of a synthesis of heterogenous elements that only in their collation recognizes their identity. Comprehension sublates this dualism, and, by doing that, it sublates also the empiricist approach (...) to knowledge and the correspondence theory of truth which, for Hegel, are at its basis. (shrink)

Most models of generational succession in sexually reproducing populations necessarily move back and forth between genic and genotypic spaces. We show that transitions between and within these spaces are usually hidden by unstated assumptions about processes in these spaces. We also examine a widely endorsed claim regarding the mathematical equivalence of kin-, group-, individual-, and allelic-selection models made by Lee Dugatkin and Kern Reeve. We show that the claimed mathematical equivalence of the models does not hold. *Received January 2007; revised (...) April 2008. †To contact the authors, please write to: Elisabeth Lloyd, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 130 Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; e-mail: [email protected]; Richard Lewontin, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 26 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; Marcus Feldman, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Gow raised a new and interesting problem for externalist representationalism, the conclusion of which is that its proponents are unable to provide an acceptable account of the phenomenal character of colour hallucination. In contrast to Gow, we do not believe that the problem is particularly severe – indeed, that there is any problem at all. Thus our aim is to defend externalist representationalism against the problem raised by Gow. To this end, we will first reconstruct her (...) reasoning, and then show that it poses no real challenge to externalist representationalism. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es poner de manifiesto las dificultades que implica desde su origen mismo la estructura argumentativa adoptada en este respecto por Tomás y, ulteriormente, mostrar que dicha estructura contiene el germen de su propia disolución, así como tendencialmente también el de la disolución de la metafísica teológica como disciplina filosófica.

this requirement for adaptations. Emergent characters are always potential adaptations. Not all selection processes produce adaptations, however. The key issue, in delineating a selection process, is the relationship between a character and fitness. The emergent character approach is more restrictive than alternative schemas that delineate selection..

This paper argues for a ‘contextualist’ approach to teaching antisemitism in philosophy class. The traditional ‘systematic’ approach emphasizes recognizing and dismantling antisemitic aspects in canonical philosophical texts. The introduced contextualist approach broadens the perspective, treating philosophy as a continuous debate embedded in cultural realities. It focuses on historical controversies rather than isolated arguments, includes the voice and the perspectives of the oppressed, and so has the potential to broaden traditional philosophical canons. In the second half of the paper, we provide (...) a case study of the contextualist approach, applying it to the ‘Berlin antisemitism controversy’ of 1879/80. We argue that the contextualist approach is particularly valuable when dealing with antisemitism as it teaches students to analyze arguments within the socio-political landscape and to identify antisemitic elements. The students thereby acquire the skills to discern antisemitic argumentation in other contexts as well. We suggest that this approach could be used to teach other debates in the history of philosophy, especially those tackling race, sex, and gender issues. (shrink)

The conflation of two fundamentally distinct issues has generated serious confusion in the philosophical and biological literature concerning the units of selection. The question of how a unit of selection of defined, theoretically, is rarely distinguished from the question of how to determine the empirical accuracy of claims--either specific or general--concerning which unit(s) is undergoing selection processes. In this paper, I begin by refining a definition of the unit of selection, first presented in the philosophical literature by William Wimsatt, which (...) is grounded in the structure of natural selection models. I then explore the implications of this structural definition for empirical evaluation of claims about units of selection. I consider criticisms of this view presented by Elliott Sober--criticisms taken by some (for example, Mayo and Gilinsky 1987) to provide definitive damage to the structuralist account. I shall show that Sober has misinterpreted the structuralist views; he knocks down a straw man in order to motivate his own causal account. Furthermore, I shall argue, Sober's causal account is dependent on the structuralist account that he rejects. I conclude by indicating how the refined structural definition can clarify which sorts of empirical evidence could be brought to bear on a controversial case involving units of selection. (shrink)

The core of Kant’s criticism of the ontological argument is the thesis that existence is not a real predicate capable of being added to the concept of an object. The concept of the most perfect or the most real being is a subjective content that is as such completely determined, that is to say, that already has all the determinations that define that concept as such. Therefore, to know if that object also exists in the real world is indispensable that (...) the subject has an intuition of it. The absence of such intuition is, according to Kant, an insuperable obstacle for the different attempts to prove the existence of God. Although Hegel agrees in principle with Kant´s claim that existence must not be conceived as a real predicate, he considers, however, that to understand it as the position of the already exhaustively determined concept of the object does not imply a true overcoming of the particular notion of existence that is at the base of the ontological argument. In this article I defend the claim that Hegel´s counter-criticism of Kant´s criticism of the ontological argument is actually a radicalization of Kant´s general critique of metaphysics. (shrink)

One of the main obstacles to the realization of intentions for future actions and to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is lack of self-control. But, what does it mean to engage in self-controlled behaviour? On a motivational construal of self-control, self-control involves resisting our competing temptations, impulses, and urges in order to do what we deem to be best. The conflict we face is between our better judgments or intentions and “hot” motivational forces that drive or compel us to (...) act in opposing ways. In contrast, on an executive construal of self-control, the emphasis is not on overcoming temptation, but on overriding or inhibiting “cold” automatically triggered routines and habits that are at odds with what we intend to do. Our general aim in this chapter is to contribute to the development of an overarching theory of self-control by exploring ways in which these two apparently competing frameworks can be reconciled. We propose that self-control is best understood as a hybrid set of skills. We draw on recent work on expert motor skill to highlight important ways in which experts differ from novices in the capacities they deploy and the ways in which they deploy them. We consider analogies (and disanalogies) between the domain of sports expertise and the domain of self-control. We end by considering how such a hybrid approach can help us reconcile a motivational and an executive approach to self-control. (shrink)

Hegel develops his theory of will simultaneously in two different contexts of his work: on one side, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the corresponding Berlin lessons and in texts which can be considered as incipient versions of the Encyclopedia; on the other hand, in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, the lessons based on them and in previous texts on the Philosophy of Right in which Hegel exposes his theory of subjective will. Now, the systematic structure and (...) consequent periodization of the volitive process differ in both cases. This article aims to reconstruct Hegel’s System of the will by integrating organically the developments of both groups of texts. (shrink)